This paper tries to investigate the question of how virtual cybercrimes fall within the realm of criminal law and what their principles and conditions of criminalization are. Despite the large number of Internet users in virtual worlds, such as "Second Life", there has been limited literature and research especially on the extent and scope of the issue, the identity of the perpetrators and victims, as well as the consequences of cybercrimes. The present study is an applied and qualitative research and according to data collection, it is a library research (meta-analysis secondary studies) on the basis of internal and external online resources. The article provides necessary and sufficient conditions to include virtual cybercrime in a subset of criminal law by using philosophical ontology as well as philosophy of law. It is concluded that necessary condition for virtual-cyber acts as a crime to be placed under law to obtain a Meta-Virtual outcome. The sufficient condition is that the outcome of this entity, justifies interference with the freedom of citizens to use the criminal law on the basis of a principle limiting freedom of Feinberg.
