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Showing 2 results for Forgery Attack
Amir Allahdadi Ghiyasabadi , Javad Alizadeh,
Volume 11, Issue 1 (9-2022)
Abstract
With the development of new information and communication technologies such as developments related to Internet of Things applications, the importance of information and maintaining its security is more and more considered. Key agreement and authentication protocols play an important role in ensuring information security. One of the important components used in many applications of the Internet of Things is wireless sensor networks, whose security is ensured by using appropriate protocols of these networks. In 2020, Sikarwar and Das presented a key agreement protocol with authentication for wireless sensor networks and claimed that this protocol is secure against well-known attacks such as feedback attacks, password discovery, and man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, it is shown that the Sikarvar and DOS protocol is not secure and an attacker can easily obtain this key. In addition, it is shown that the protocol cannot be secure against password discovery and spoofing attacks.
Javad Alizadeh, Seyyed Hadi Noorani Asl,
Volume 12, Issue 2 (2-2024)
Abstract
The Internet of Drones (IoD) refers to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) connected to the Internet. This concept is a specific application of IoT. The IoD may offer opportunities, but it also poses security vulnerabilities. It is necessary to use authentication and key agreement protocols in drone communications to prevent these vulnerabilities. In 2020, Alladi et al presented an authentication and key agreement protocol based on physical unclonable functions called SecAutUAV. They analyzed the security of their scheme through both formal and informal methods. In this paper, we demonstrate the vulnerability of the SecAuthUAV protocol to a key recovery attack. An adversary can obtain a session key between a drone and a ground station by intercepting and analyzing the session data. In addition, we present a secret value recovery attack with complexity  , which is lower than the complexity of brute force attacks. An adversary could spoof and track the drone by using these values. In order to improve the security and efficiency of SecAuthUAV, we present a new version and compare it to the original. We utilize both the informal method and formal-based ProVerif to analyze the
security of the latest protocol. To compare the efficiency of the new protocol and SecAuthUAV, we counted their number of operators and functions. The new protocol is more secure and efficient than SecAutUAV.
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