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Showing 2 results for Gholami
Mr Mohammad Hossein Noorallahzadeh, Mr Ahmad Gholami, Mr Reza Alimoradi,
Volume 9, Issue 2 (2-2021)
Abstract
With the advent of cloud computing, data owners tend to submit their data to cloud servers and allow users to access data when needed. However, outsourcing sensitive data will lead to privacy issues. Encrypting data before outsourcing solves privacy issues, but in this case, we will lose the ability to search the data. Searchable encryption (SE) schemes have been proposed to achieve this feature of searching encrypted data without compromising privacy. This method will protect both the user's sensitive information and the ability to search for encrypted data. In this article, we review the various SE designs. In this review, we present the classification of SE designs: symmetric searchable encryption, public key searchable encryption, and search attribute-based encryption schemes, and then a detailed discussion of SE designs in terms of index structure. And provide search functionality. There is also a comparison of SE design analysis in terms of security, performance and security. In addition, we talked about the challenges, leading directions and applications of SE schemes.
Fatemeh Gholami Sabzevar, Masoumeh Safkhani,
Volume 13, Issue 2 (12-2024)
Abstract
Privacy preservation in healthcare monitoring systems has always been a concern for both patients and doctors. To address this issue, many protocols have been designed. In this article, we examine the proposed scheme by Nasr Esfahani and colleagues, evaluating it from a security perspective. Their proposed scheme uses a three-layer hierarchical template chain to store and maintain critical medical information of patients in a centralized and secure manner. Additionally, by using Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) and ring signature methods, they demonstrate that their scheme protects medical data against both internal and external attacks. According to potential scenarios, the Nasr Esfahani et al. protocol has shown good performance against many attacks, such as storage attacks and replay attacks, but it is vulnerable to integrity violation attacks. The success probability of the attacks presented in this article is one, and the complexity is only a single execution of the protocol.
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